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IS OPEN VOIR DIRE "A GOOD THING"? ABC, INC. V. MARTHA
STEWART: THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
INTERPRETATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS DURING JURY
SELECTION IN HIGH-PROFILE CELEBRITY TRIALS
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2004 has been labeled the "Year of the Celebrity
Trial."2 Without a doubt, high-profile celebrity cases receive a great
deal of media attention.3 The media coverage present in television,
newspaper, and Internet sources inundates the public with the lat-
est stories from the Michael Jackson child molestation trial and the
Kobe Bryant rape trial, to the Scott Peterson murder trial. 4 This
constant attention may prejudice potential jurors and have an ad-
verse impact on celebrity defendants. 5 On the other hand, courts
respond to the potential harm to celebrity defendants by imposing
gag orders, changing venue, and sequestering juries, thus manipu-
1. 360 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
2. Kevin Brass, Trial and Error?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Apr./May 2004 (re-
marking 2004 turning into 'Year of Celebrity Trial" with assortment of celebrity
trials creating "perfect storm" of media events), available at http://www.ajr.org/
Article.asp?id=3632; Barbara Cochran, Doors Closed to Media in Celebrity Trials,
RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, Mar. 2004 (observing six celebrity trials have occurred
recently: actor Robert Blake, professional basketball player Kobe Bryant, singer
Michael Jackson, high-profile defendant Scott Peterson, entrepreneur/home-d6-
cor mogul Martha Stewart, and former professional basketball player Jayson Wil-
liams), available at http://www.rtndf.org/about/pres-mar04.shtml. The
numerous star-powered trials have made this not only the year of the celebrity trial,
but also the year of the secret trial as well. See Cochran, supra.
3. See Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused: Protecting Defendants'
Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901, 902 (2003) (noting heavy
television and print coverage of three categories of high-profile cases). High-pro-
file cases include cases containing sexual or sordid facts that "appeal to people's
voyeuristic tendencies," where the crime is exceptionally horrific, and cases in
which the defendants are celebrities. See id.
4. See Gene Policinski, Why the rash of restraints against the news?, FIRST AMEND-
MENT CENTER.ORG, at http://www.fac.org/analysis.aspx?id=13897 (Aug. 20, 2004)
(observing media's pursuit of information in Bryant, Jackson, and Stewart cases);
see alsoJulie Hinds, 2004's pop-culture puzzlers, DETROIT FREE PRESS.cOM, at http://
www.freep.com/features/living/question28e-20041228.htm (Dec. 28, 2004) (sug-
gesting exhaustive media coverage of celebrity trials keeps society's mind off more
pressing concerns like war and economic troubles).
5. See Laurie Nicole Robinson, Comment, Professional Athletes-Held to a Higher
Standard and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the
Need for States to Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1313 (1998) (noting
celebrity defendants receive increased media coverage and that "triers of fact may
be influenced as to the guilt or innocence of the high-profile defendant").
(297)
1
Stehlin: Is Open Voir Dire a Good Thing - ABC, Inc. v. Martha Stewart: The
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
298 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
lating the justice system in order to keep the media away and to
protect celebrities. 6
In ABC, Inc. v. Stewart,7 the Second Circuit considered whether
an order banning media agencies from voir dire examinations in the
high-profile Martha Stewart case infringed upon the media's right
of access.8 Consequently, the Second Circuit had to decide
whether the public's First Amendment right of access to criminal
trials gives way to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial.9
This Note examines the Second Circuit's holding and rationale
in Stewart as well as the implications this decision carries for future
celebrity litigants. Section II details the facts and procedural his-
tory of Stewart.10 Section III provides an overview of problems that
occur in high-profile celebrity trials.1 Section III also demonstrates
how the First and Sixth Amendments conflict when the balancing
test for voir dire is applied in intense media coverage cases. 12 Sec-
6. See Cochran, supra note 2 (describing actions by judges to keep trial events
secret). In Bryant's rape trial, the judge barred reporters from using tape record-
ers and from photographing witnesses. See id. In Jackson's child molestation trial,
the judge denied a request by news organizations for live broadcast coverage. See
id. In the high-profile murder trial of Scott Peterson, the trial judge ordered the
witness list and potential juror list to be kept secret and banned cameras in the
courtroom. See id.; see also Policinski, supra note 4 (illustrating methods used by
judges to minimize possible effects from intense media coverage); Linda Deutsch,
Experts on the media warn of different justice system for celebrities, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., July 24, 2004, at A5 (discussing gag orders in Jackson and Bryant criminal
trials and closed jury selection in Stewart trial). " [E]xtraordinary secrecy imposed
by judges" may create a "two-tiered justice system - one for celebrities and one for
everyone else." Deutsch, supra, at A5; see also Dahlia Lithwick, Of Fame and Fairness,
Am. LAW., Mar. 2004, at 114 (doubting usefulness of techniques used by courts to
keep publicity at bay). The article suggests:
[T]ools afforded judges to control the effects of pretrial publicity (voir
dire, sequestration, postponement, and absurd instructions to ignore that
which you know to be true) are the legal equivalents of a stone and flint.
If we are going to ensure that the rich and famous receive unbiased ju-
ries, we need to make some drastic changes to the legal system.
Id.
7. 360 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
8. See id. at 93 (setting out issues involved on appeal).
9. See id. (recognizing case requires balance of "two weighty constitutional
rights: the First Amendment right of the press and of the public to access criminal
proceedings and the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to a fair
trial").
10. For a discussion of the facts and procedural background of Stewart, see
infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of problems that arise in criminal trials with intense me-
dia coverage, see infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
12. For a background of prior cases dealing with the First and Sixth Amend-
ments and intense media coverage cases, see infra notes 53-112 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 12: p. 297
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tion IV explains the Second Circuit's foundation for its holding in
Stewart.13 Section V analyzes the court's reasoning based on its
prior holdings and additional authority.14 Finally, Section VI of this
Note examines the likely consequences of the court's holding in
Stewart on future voir dire cases and on the public's perception of
fairness in the judicial process. 15
II. FACTS
An alliance of news organizations and publications ("Media
Coalition")16 moved to vacate a district court order closing voir dire
proceedings in the high-profile case involving Martha Stewart.17
The Media Coalition alleged the order violated the public's First
Amendment right to access criminal trials.' 8
Martha Stewart's popularity has steadily increased over the past
few decades. Stewart's notoriety made the Media Coalition's battle
over access one worth fighting for. Since 1982, Martha Stewart has
been involved in the home-lifestyle industry, building Martha Stew-
art Omnimedia, Inc. into a successful multi-billion dollar company
13. For an examination of the Second Circuit's reasoning in Stewart, see infra
notes 113-52 and accompanying text.
14. For a critical analysis of the court's holding and rationale in Stewart, see
infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the potential effect of this decision, see infra notes 166-
79 and accompanying text.
16. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 96 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004) (listing sixteen
members of Media Coalition: ABC, Inc.; American Lawyer Media; The Associated
Press; Bloomberg, L.P.; CBS Broadcasting, Inc.; Cable News Network, L.P.,
L.L.L.P.; Daily News, L.P.; DowJones & Co., Inc.; Fox News Network, L.L.C., Fox
Television Stations, Inc.; Gannett Co., Inc.; NBC, Inc.; Newsday, Inc.; NYP Hold-
ings, Inc.; The New York Times Co.; Reuters; and The Washington Post Co.).
17. See United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2004 WL 65159, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2004) (setting forth reasoning leading to closure of voir dire).
The opinion states:
WHEREAS, there is a substantial risk that such publication [of juror re-
sponses to voir dire questions] or the possibility of such publication would
prevent prospective jurors from giving full and frank answers to questions
posed to them during voir dire ... ; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no
member of the press may be present for any voir dire proceedings that are
conducted in the robing room; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a tran-
script of each day's voir dire proceedings will be made public ... with the
names of prospective or selected jurors redacted . . . ; IT IS FURTHER
* ORDERED that no member of the press may sketch or photograph or
divulge the name of any prospective or selected juror ....
Id.
18. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 96 (indicating aspects of motion to vacate district
court order). Specifically, the Media Coalition challenged three parts of the dis-
trict court's order: the closure of the voir dire proceedings, the provision for jury
anonymity, and the restraint on publication of jurors' names. See id.
2005]
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that sells "how-to" products for home decorating. 19 This success
has made Martha Stewart "America's most trusted guide to stylish
living."20 As a well-known public figure, when criminal charges
against Stewart were announced, the media swarmed. 2 1
In 2001, the federal government brought criminal charges
against Stewart for violating securities laws and for making false
statements to federal agents. 2 2 From the start, the Stewart case at-
tracted an extraordinary amount of media focus. 23 In response to
the pretrial publicity, Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
19. See About Martha: Martha's Biography, MARTHASTEWART.COM, at http://www.
marthastewart.com/page.jhtml?type=learn-cat&id=cat653&navLevel=4 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2005) (recounting Stewart's personal and professional background).
Stewart is a best-selling author, Emmy award winner, television and radio host, and
newspaper columnist. See id.
20. Id. (listing honors earned by Martha Stewart). Among Stewart's honors
and awards are: being named one of "America's 25 Most Influential People" in
Time Magazine (June 1996) and one of "New York's 100 Most Influential Women
in Business." Id.; see also Allan Chernoff, Martha's lawyer rebuts charges, at http://
money.cnn.com/2004/03/02/news/companies/martha/ (Mar. 2, 2004) (noting
Martha Stewart's well-known catchphrase is describing something as "a good
thing").
21. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 94 (mentioning immediate intense media cover-
age given to case).
22. See id. at 93-94 (listing numerous criminal charges against Stewart stem-
ming from December 27, 2001 stock sale). The charges alleged Stewart illegally
sold 3,928 shares of ImClone Systems, Inc. stock. See id. The government charged
Stewart and her stockbroker Peter Bacanovic with federal securities law and regula-
tion violations alleging Bacanovic gave Stewart non-public information that she
used in selling her stock. See id. The case states:
Specifically, Stewart stands accused of conspiracy to commit offenses
against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000); making
false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); obstruction of
agency proceedings, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000); and securi-
ties fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). Bacanovic is charged
with conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000); making false statements and documents, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000); pejury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (2000); and obstruction of agency proceedings, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1505 (2000).
Id. at 94; see also Daniel Kadlec, Not a Good Thing For Martha, TIME MAG., Mar. 15,
2004, at 60 (noting Stewart was found guilty of obstruction of justice on March 5,
2004).
23. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 94 (referring to district court Judge Cedarbaum's
concerns regarding unusually high level of publicity surrounding trial). From the
start, Judge Cedarbaum, the government and defendants, devised a two-part voir
dire process to try to empanel an unbiased jury despite the intense media scrutiny.
See id. First, the process required potential jurors be selected based on their an-
swers to a lengthy questionnaire. See id. Second, the remaining jurors would then
be questioned away from other jurors in the judge's robing room. See id.
[Vol. 12: p. 297
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issued an order barring media contact with potential jurors.2 4 De-
spite the order, certain portions of the jury questionnaire appeared
on a website. 25 Judge Cedarbaum believed the press was identifying
and singling out prospective jurors. 26 As a result, the government
asked the district judge to exclude the media from attending the
voir dire proceedings. 27 Noting the "widespread and intense media
coverage" of the case, the districtjudge banned the media from the
voir dire proceedings. 28 To appease the media, the district judge
ordered the publication of the redacted transcript of each day's po-
tential juror questioning.2 9 In response, the Media Coalition ap-
pealed the district court's closure of the voir dire proceedings.30
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held
that the voir dire proceedings should have been open to the
public.3 1
24. See United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2004 WL 65159, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2004). The district court held the January 2, 2004 order "was
,necessary to ensure the integrity of [the] proceedings' as well as 'the public's and
the parties' overriding interest in a fair trial."' Stewart, 360 F.3d at 94.
25. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 94 (discussing that district court became aware
website www.gawker.com contained posting paraphrasing portion of jury
questionnaire).
26. See id. (citing district court order considering speculation that prospective
jurors and their responses to voir dire questions may be disclosed).
27. See id. (mentioning government memorandum to district court asking me-
dia be excluded from voir dire in robing room). The government was concerned
with ensuring juror candor. See id. Although it was the government that initially
requested closed proceedings, the defendants also agreed. See id.
28. See id. at 95 (quoting district court's ruling requiring voir dire to take place
in robing room). The district court allowed a transcript of the jury selection pro-
ceedings to be made public with the names ofjurors removed, or any information
any juror requested not be made public. See id.
29. See id. (noting district court order). District court Judge Cedarbaum
stated that by allowing a redacted transcript of each day's proceedings to be pub-
lished, she had chosen a less restrictive alternative to completely closing voir dire.
See id.
30. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 96 (recounting Media Coalition's motion to vacate
or modify district court's order closing voir dire). The district court denied the
Media Coalition's request for a stay of voir dire pending appeal, and therefore,
closed voir dire examinations started on January 20, 2004. See id. at 97. Although
the Media Coalition also challenged the district court's requirement of juror ano-
nymity and restraint on publication of jurors' names, the Second Circuit only ex-
amined the district court's closure of voir dire examinations on appeal. See id. at 96.
31. See id. at 93 (holding under particulars of case, district court erred in clos-
ing voir dire examinations to public). The Second Circuit also noted that since voir
dire was already complete for the Stewart trial at the time of its decision, the "rem-
edy has no practical implications with respect to this case." See id. The Second
Circuit chose, however, to decide the case because the issues presented were likely
to be repeated in future cases. See id.
20051
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III.. BACKGROUND
A. Problems Created by High-Profile Celebrity Trials
Is the constant media attention given to high-profile trials in
the best interest of the justice system? 32 It is becoming increasingly
obvious that celebrity trials are not ordinary trials.33 The media at-
tention given to high-profile trials causes problems for courts, such
as finding impartial jurors.34 Celebrity trials also foster the debate
about whether celebrities receive preferential or unusual treatment
in the justice system compared to ordinary defendants. 3 5 These
problems suggest that the media attention afforded to celebrity tri-
als hinders, rather than helps, the justice system.36
1. Difficulty Finding Impartial Decision Makers
The public's interest in high-profile criminal trials has recently
grown, thereby increasing the amount of media attention afforded
32. See Mike Hoeflich, Can celebrities get justice?, LAWRENCE J.-WoRLD, Aug. 18,
2004 (asking whether celebrity trials are so newsworthy as to be in best interests of
accused and accusers), available at http://www.ljworld.com/section/citynews/
story/ 178777. Hoeflich suggests the media has a duty to cover only newsworthy
events. See id. The media's focus on celebrity trials points to a problem in having a
society that prioritizes the coverage of tragedies. . See id.
33. See id. (recognizing motives of both prosecutors and defendants are differ-
ent in high-profile cases). Book deals and mercenary agendas are aspects that
arise out of, and are unique to, celebrity trials. See id.; see also Lithwick, supra note
6, at 114 ("Does it matter that celebrities may be able to buy themselves first-classjustice .. .[o]r are juries too smart to fall for such manipulation?"). Lithwick also
mentions jurors in high-profile cases may find instant fame for themselves through
television appearances or book deals after the trial has ended. See Lithwick, supra
note 6, at 114. But see Recent Legislation, Criminal Procedure - Witnesses and Jurors-
California Enacts Ban on Receipt of Money for Information, 108 HARv. L. Rv. 1214,
1214 (1994-95) (announcing in effort to promote fair trials, California legislature
passed Brown-Kopp Bill, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1669.7 (1994)). California lawmakers
grew concerned over pretrial publicity after O.J. Simpson double-murder trial in
which tabloids offered jurors money for inside information. See id. The new law
makes it a misdemeanor for jurors or witnesses to be given compensation for pro-
viding information relating to a criminal case within specified time periods. See id.
Further, witnesses must wait one year from the crime's commission and jurors
must wait ninety days after their discharge before they can sell their stories. See id.
at 1215. In addition, anyone who tries to pay a juror or witness may be guilty of
tampering with a jury. See id. Supporters of the new law argue it helps support the
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and that the First Amendment does not guar-
antee jurors compensation for selling their stories. See id.
34. For a discussion on the difficulty in finding impartial jurors, see infra
notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of the public's view that celebrity trials are different than
ordinary trials, see infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
36. See Hoeflich, supra note 32 (proposing if media printed only news that is
"fit to print," celebrity trial news would diminish and have beneficial impact on
justice).
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each case.3 7 A side effect of this amplification in media focus is the
trial court's increased difficulty in finding impartial jurors .3  The
comprehensive nature of the pretrial publicity reaches a larger pop-
ulation of potential jurors and supplies them with an in-depth view
of the crime and the defendant. The information provided by the
media creates a larger population of potential jurors with pre-set
notions about the case. 39
It is the trial court's duty to take certain measures to prevent
pretrial publicity from having a prejudicial effect on the jury pool.40
There are several methods to reduce the potential juror prejudice.
First, the trial court must consider the extent and nature of the
publicity in order to decide whether the media attention is prejudi-
cial. 41 Second, if there is a high risk that heavy exposure to prejudi-
cial publicity will bias potential jurors, it is the trial court's
responsibility to utilize various techniques that lessen the publicity's
effect and ensure a defendant receives a fair trial.42
37. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Crimi-
nal Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 AM.
U. L. REv. 39, 44 (1996) (defining high-profile case as "one in which there is perva-
sive and continuous national media treatment in newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television for the duration of the investigatory and pretrial proceedings"); see
also Robinson, supra note 5, at 1313 ("Within the last decade, interest in high-
profile criminal cases has grown to phenomenal levels.").
38. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 1313 (suggesting potential jurors may be
influenced by media coverage concerning guilt or innocence of celebrity
defendant).
39. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 45 (illustrating how public-
ity reaches and impacts potential jurors). Irrespective of origin, whether it was a
particularly sordid case or involved a celebrity, once a trial becomes nationally no-
torious, the trial becomes more difficult. See id.
40. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (holding massive, per-
vasive, and prejudicial publicity disabled defendant from getting fair trial). In the
Sheppard murder trial, a newspaper published the names and addresses of potential
jurors causing them to receive letters and calls about the case. See id. at 342. The
Court in Sheppard also took into account that because the courtroom was so packed
with media representatives, witnesses and counsel could not be heard. See id. at
344. The Supreme Court held Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. See id. at 335.
The trial court must take all necessary precautions to ensure a fair trial, including
controlling the release of information to the press, limiting the number of media
members in the courtroom, and protecting witnesses from the media. See id. at
359; see also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (recognizing
trial judge has affirmative constitutional duty to take measures that ensure defen-
dant receives fair trial).
1 41. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 45 (emphasizing trial
judges look at scope (how widespread publicity is) and nature (how in-depth and
detailed publicity is) in deciding prejudicial effect).
42. See id. (recognizing task of trial court to look for prejudicial effects); see
also Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass
Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 631, 646 (1991) (noting Supreme Court requires judges
2005]
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Trial courts use the following techniques to find and maintain
impartial jurors: change of venue, gag orders, trial continuance,
voir dire, jury sequestration, and judicial instructions. 43 Each of
these procedures attempt to ensure finding an impartial jury.44
Each technique, however, has flaws or difficulties sometimes ren-
dering it ineffective. 45 Further, each method must be utilized prop-
erly to avoid violating the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom
of the press and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a speedy and
public trial. 46
to use variety of methods to identify impartiality and to minimize impact of public-
ity in courtrooms).
43. See Minow & Cate, supra note 42, at 646-54 (listing common judicial reme-
dies for pretrial publicity). Examples include: changing venue by moving the trial
to another jurisdiction; a continuance delays the trial, allowing time for the media
focus to settle down; jury instructions such as directions telling the jury to ignore
outside information; and voir dire questioning of jurors to determine impartiality.
See id.; see also Morris, supra note 3, at 906-07, 912-13 (discussing use of gag orders
and jury sequestration). A gag order prohibits lawyers, witnesses, jurors, and court
personnel from making any harmful extrajudicial statements outside of the court-
room. See Morris, supra note 3, at 906. Jury sequestration restricts jury access to
extrajudicial information in order to ensure jurors reach a verdict based solely on
evidence from the trial. See id. at 912.
44. See Darren Carroll et al., Free Press and Fair Trial: The Role of Behavioral
Research, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 192 (1986) (recognizing helpful practices for
dealing with impartiality include voir dire, jury instructions, sequestration, continu-
ance, and gag orders).
45. See Minow & Cate, supra note 42, at 646-50 (observing difficulties each
technique encompasses even when used properly to empanel impartial jury).
Change of venue sometimes upsets members of the local community who have the
primary interest in resolving the case. See id. at 647. Moreover, when the publicity
is not just concentrated in one locality, but rather all over the country, change of
venue itself is ineffective. See id. Continuance puts an unnecessarily heavy burden
on the court system and may violate a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial. See id. at 647-48. Judicial instructions may be ineffective because few people
can correct their thoughts just because they were instructed to do so. See id. at
648; see also Morris, supra note 3, at 924-33 (explaining ineffectiveness of current
devices courts use to remedy pretrial publicity effects). A gag order by itself does
not help because gag orders cannot constitutionally prevent the media from re-
porting anything it learns. See Morris, supra note 3, at 24. Further, a gag order
only restricts trial participants' ability to give information and does not restrict the
underlying information to which the media has easy access, such as the identity of
the accused in rape trials. See id. Jury sequestration is not a perfect solution to
protect a defendant's right to a fair trial because of the "high social and financial
costs" of sequestration. Id. at 928. Further,jury sequestration may be ineffective at
minimizing the effects of pretrial publicity because it comes into play late in the
trial process. See id. By the time jurors are empanelled, most have already been in
contact with some form of media influence. See id.
46. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 46 (asserting it is essential
for judicial remedies to ensure impartiality and must not interfere with constitu-
tional requirements). The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... "U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
[Vol. 12: p. 297
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2. Inequities Within the Criminal Justice System
In addition to the hardships associated with finding impartial
jurors, celebrity trials may frustrate public policy. In particular, if
celebrity trial judges need to go out of their way to use various judi-
cial techniques to protect the rights of celebrities, then justice is not
shaped by laws, but rather, manipulated according to whom the
laws are being applied. 47 Some argue that judges differentiate be-
tween celebrity and ordinary non-celebrity trials for selfish rea-
sons.48 Regardless of why celebrity defendants receive extra
protection, inequities are created between celebrity and non-celeb-
rity defendants. There are both advantages and disadvantages to
being a high-profile or celebrity defendant. 49 Celebrity defendants
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47. See Tony Mauro, Judges wrongly close court to protect jurors, USA TODAY, Jan.
21, 2004, at 15A (opining defendants' constitutional guarantee to fair trial has
morphed into trial by invisible jury in celebrity cases). By isolating potential jurors
from the public and the media, judges are putting up barriers to the public's right
to know how justice is being carried out. See id.; see also Paul K. McMasters, Inside
the First Amendment: Celebrity privacy claims trump public justice, NAPLES DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 2, 2004 (commenting that providing celebrities greater privacy in trials causes
"great danger that our justice will be shaped less by laws and scrutiny by the public
than by the fame or notoriety of the defendants"), available at http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=13803. See generally
Cochran, supra note 2 (proposing celebrity trials should be more transparent than
regular trials). Trials that are especially open help give the public "confidence that
those on trial are not getting special treatment-or unfair treatment-just because
they are rich or famous." Id.
48. SeeJennifer Barrett, The First Amendment on Trial, MSNBC.coM, at http://
www.msnbc.com/id/4497726/site/newsweek (Mar. 10, 2004) (opining important
issue in high-profile cases is fact that celebrity cases are highlight of judge's ca-
reer); see also Ken Paulson, Inside the First Amendment- Locking out the public, NAPLES
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 2004 (commenting on factors that influence judges' decisions
to limit press), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commen-
tary.aspx?id=12771. These factors include genuine resentment on the part of
judges toward members of the media. See Paulson, supra. The job of judges is to
administer justice efficiently, and therefore, media intrusion can feel unsettling
and cause the judge to hastily keep information quiet rather than give out informa-
tion. See id.
49. See Julie Hilden, Celebrity Justice: Famous, Wealthy Criminal Defendants Can
Hire High-Priced Lawyers, But Do They Also Face Disadvantages?, at http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/2004082 7 .html (Aug. 27, 2004) (comparing differ-
ences between ordinary person and celebrity defendant); see also Robinson, supra
note 5, at 1327-30 (recognizing defendants who are professional athletes may
sometimes be held to higher standard). Defendants with celebrity status are faced
with the heavy burden of living up to society's expectation that they are "flawless
human beings." See Robinson, supra note 5, at 1328.
An example is the 1983 criminal case involving Kansas City Royals baseball
players Willie Wilson, Jerry Martin, and Willie Aiken. See id. The players were
charged with a federal misdemeanor for attempted cocaine possession. See id. The
typical first-time offender charged with this drug offense would be required to pay
a fine. See id. The magistrate judge in this case, however, sentenced each player to
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have access to the best lawyers and a greater ability to use the press
to their advantage than do ordinary defendants. 50 Alternatively,
high-profile defendants are subject to prosecution by the press and
risk having a severely damaged reputation after trial, even if they
are acquitted or prosecuted for only a minor offense.51 Whether or
not the media's involvement in high-profile and celebrity trials is
positive or negative, it results in decisions that impact how the law is
defined.52
three months in jail. See id. The magistrate judge stated "because [the defend-
ants] were professional baseball players and something of role models for chil-
dren, they should be held to a higher standard." Id.
On the contrary, athletes are sometimes held above the law and may receive
smaller punishment or preferential treatment from police. See id. at 1331. An ex-
ample is professional baseball player Barry Bonds, who went to court to get his
child-support payment reduced. See id. Judge George Taylor reduced the family
support payment and then asked Bonds for an autograph. See id. The public ob-jection to the judge's request caused Judge Taylor to reverse his decision and re-
cuse himself from the case. See id.
50. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 1331 (observing benefits given to celebritydefendants). Talented attorneys jump at the chance to work for celebrity or high-profile defendants because the media exposure causes the lawyers themselves tobecome celebrity figures. See id. Celebrity defendants can use the press to do in-terviews to get their side out early, something a non-newsworthy, ordinary person
cannot do. See id.
51. See Hilden, supra note 49 (recognizing personal risks celebrity defendants
face). The article states:
Interestingly, the phenomenon of 'prosecution by the press' can go fur-
ther than simply an assault on character that tends to poison the jury
pool or hurt the celebrity's career. It can also lead to the scoop-hungrypress - in particular, the courtroom press - unearthing additional evi-dence in the case and, in effect, adding private resources to the prosecu-
tion's already well-funded investigation.
Id.; see also World News Tonight With PeterJennings: A Closer Look Kobe Inc. (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, Aug. 4, 2003) ("Until sexual assault charges made headlines this
summer, Bryant was one of the most marketable players in sports. He has a multi-
million-dollar deal with Nike and big contracts with Sprite, Spalding and McDon-
ald's."). Another Bryant sponsor, Nutella, a chocolate spread manufacturer,
dropped Bryant from a $500,000 a year advertising contract after the publication
of sexual assault charges against him. See World News Tonight With PeterJennings: ACloser Look Kobe Inc. (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 4, 2003). "For Kobe Bryant,
whether he is guilty or not, the price of a tarnished reputation could total $15
million." Id.
52. See Deutsch, supra note 6, at A5 (observing impact high-profile cases have
on non-celebrity trials). The article quoted Loyola University Law Professor LaurieLevinson stating, "the actions taken in high-visibility cases end up defining the lawfor everybody else." Id. "The judicial obsession with treating celebrities in a man-
ner different than all other defendants has turned the courts in an unprecedented
direction." Associated Press, Jackson Pretrial Hearing Focuses on Keeping Documents
Secret, MARIN INDEP. J., June 25, 2004.
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B. The Sixth Amendment: The Litigant's Argument for Closure
of Voir Dire
Voir dire is the primary and preferred remedy for pretrial pub-
licity.5 3 It is an opportunity for the judge or attorneys in the case to
question potential jurors to determine whether they can be impar-
tial.54 To ensure that a proper jury is empanelled, it is imperative
that the jurors answer the questions during voir dire truthfully.
5 5
Supporters of closed voir dire argue that jurors in high publicity
cases may be hesitant to give truthful answers fearing that their an-
swers will be made public.56 By withholding their true opinions, or
by formulating pre-conceived notions about the trial based on me-
dia reports, biased jurors may be empanelled.5 7 This would result
in a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial.
The Supreme Court recognizes that portions of pretrial pro-
ceedings should be closed to the public in order to control pretrial
publicity.58 The theory is that closing these proceedings will stop
53. See Minow & Cate, supra note 42, at 649-50 (stating most judges favor voir
dire as way to determine which citizens are impartial enough to sit on jury).
54. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984) (quoting Yount v. Patton,
710 F.2d 956, 979 (3d Cir. 1983)) (noting that "'[a] thorough and skillfully con-
ducted voir dire should be adequate to identify juror bias, even in a community
saturated with adverse publicity adverse to the defendant.'").
55. See Glenn J. Waldman & Craig J. Trigoboff, Voir Dire Necessities: The Florida
Supreme Court Clarifies when Trial Counsel's Investigation of the Venire Must be Under-
taken, 76 FLA. B. J. 48, 48 (Oct. 2002). The article states:
Voir dire examination serves to protect that right [to an impartial trier of
fact] by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part
of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on
voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause; hints of bias not
sufficient to warrant a challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising
their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by pro-
spective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious.
Id.
56. See In re S.C. Press Ass'n, 946 F.2d 1037, 1039 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[F]rank
and forthright responses from potential jurors, which are essential to voir dire,
would be chilled if they felt that their remarks would be published in the press
. ...."); see also United States v. King, No. 94 Cr. 455 (LMM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1233, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1998) ("Prospective jurors, if made aware that their
views will be publicly disseminated in the next day's newspapers or radio or televi-
sion broadcasts, will be under pressure not to express unpopular opinions relevant
to their choice as trial jurors.").
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment allows for
a criminal defendant to enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury. See id.
58. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979) (discussing
danger of pretrial publicity on fairness of pretrial hearings). In Gannett, the trial
court barred petitioner newspaper company from a pretrial hearing on a motion
to suppress confessions allegedly given involuntarily. See id. at 374-75. Attorneys for
the defendant requested that the media be excluded because of possible prejudi-
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the press from gaining access to information that may subsequently
be published and possibly prejudice potential jurors.59 In Gannett
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,60 the Court held the Sixth Amendment does
not guarantee the public the right to attend criminal pretrial hear-
ings. 61 Gannett, however, has been read narrowly to apply solely to
pretrial proceedings. 62 Further, voir dire is not officially considered
a trial or a pretrial proceeding, and therefore, it is not protected
under Gannett.63
Advocates of closing voir dire proceedings argue that the media
is only barred from being present in the courtroom. The media is
not being denied total access bec?use a court may allow printed
transcripts of the questioning to be released. 64 This method en-
ables potential jurors to be questioned in private, promoting truth-
ful responses and satisfying the public's right of access to the
cial consequences from the adverse publicity. See id. at 375. The district attorney
did not oppose the motion and the trial judge granted the motion. See id. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision to close voir dire, holding members of the
public had no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to attend criminal trials. See id. at 392.
59. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 81 (discussing times where
courts have had to close pretrial proceedings); see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (ruling news media caused petitioner to be deprived of thatjudicial serenity and calm to which he was entitled); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,539 (1965) (holding presence of press must be limited at judicial proceedings
when it is evident that defendant might otherwise be disadvantaged). In Sheppard,
there was no doubt that the abundance of pretrial publicity reached at least some
of the jury. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358.
60. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
61. See id. at 391 (remarking that Sixth Amendment constitutional guarantee
is for benefit of defendant). It does not create a similar right for the public to
witness the trial. See id. The Court, however, went on to note that the Sixth
Amendment also does not provide the right for a defendant to demand a private
trial. See id. at 382.
62. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 36, at 83 (noting limited inter-
pretation of Gannett).
63. See Michael P. Malak, Note, First Amendment - Guarantee of Public Access to
Voir Dire, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 583, 588 (1984) (explaining loophole inGannett's protection). The Supreme Court limited its holding in Gannett in the
later case Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). In Richmond
Newspapers, the Court restricted the holding in Gannett to involve only the question
of public access to a pretrial motion under the Sixth Amendment. See 448 U.S. at587. The trial court in Richmond Newspapers granted the defendant's motion to
close his fourth retrial for murder to the public out of fear ofjury contamination.
See id. at 561. The Supreme Court reversed the decision to close the trial. See id. at
564. The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers implies that although the publicdoes not have a right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth Amendment, it does
have a right to attend criminal trials under the First Amendment. See id.
64. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393 (noting media's denial of access to proceeding
was not absolute, but rather only temporary). The media still had an opportunity
to examine the hearing information and "inform the public of the details of the
pretrial hearing accurately and completely." Id.
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proceedings.65 Access to the voir dire transcript only temporarily de-
nies the public access to information. 66 For this reason, the Su-
preme Court has held that the media's constitutional right to be
present at a criminal trial is not violated by closed proceedings if a
transcript is released.
6 7
C. The First Amendment: The Media's Argument for Open
Voir Dire
In most cases, jury selection is performed in open court where
members of the press and the public can see the actual jurors being
questioned. 68 In previous Supreme Court cases analyzing First
Amendment right of access claims, the Court has primarily focused
on the historical development of the trial by jury and the role the
public plays in the judicial proceeding in question. 69
1. Historical Tradition of Openness
The Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia7" was the first case to give the media and the public a con-
stitutional right of access to criminal trials. 71 In Richmond Newspa-
pers, Chief Justice Berger included a summary of the evolution of
open trials to show that "the historical evidence demonstrates con-
clusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, crim-
inal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively
65. See id. (promoting benefit to both public and defendant by making tran-
script readily available).
66. See Malak, supra note 63, at 586 (addressing temporary nature of media's
access denial if press is given transcript of suppressed hearing once danger of
prejudice has gone away); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 512
(1984) ("Press-Enterprise 1") (suggesting methods to avoid unnecessary closure).
"[T] he constitutional values sought to be protected by holding open proceedings
may be satisfied later by making a transcript of the closed proceedings available
within a reasonable time . . . ." Id. For a discussion of the reasoning in Press-
Enterprise I, see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
67. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393 (stating petitioner newspaper's First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights to attend criminal trial were not violated).
68. See Paulson, supra note 48 (suggesting jury selection is as important as all
other trial proceedings involving fate of defendant).
69. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise
IF) (noting previous First Amendment right of access to criminal proceeding cases
have traditionally considered both history and societal role of public access).
70. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
71. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982) (refer-
ring to Richmond Newspapers decision as first case to recognize right of access to
criminal trials is embodied in First Amendment). For a discussion of the facts and
holding of Richmond Newspapers, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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open. '72 Justice Berger noted that prior to the Norman Conquest,
criminal cases in England were brought before "moots" and the
freemen of the town had to attend all trials.7 3 After the Norman
Conquest, the freemen no longer had to attend, however, there was
no statute preventing their attendance.74 Chief Justice Berger rea-
soned, "[f] rom these early times, although great changes in courts
and procedures took place, one thing remained constant: the pub-
lic character of the trial at which guilt or innocence was decided. ' 75
Later, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,7 6 the Supreme
Court again held that the First Amendment gives the press and pub-
lic a right of access to criminal trials.7 7 Like the plurality opinion in
Richmond Newspapers, the Court in Globe Newspaper examined the his-
torical aspects of open trials to reach its decision. The Court in
Globe Newspaper, however, found that the right of access to criminal
trials is not absolute. 78 The Court held that public access to a crimi-
nal trial could be restricted only if the public access would infringe
on a compelling governmental interest. 79 Moreover, the restriction
placed on public access would have to be narrowly tailored to pro-
tect that interest.8 0 The Court's opinion in Globe Newspaper estab-
72. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569. The presumption of openness "has
long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial."
Id.
73. See id. at 565 (describing history of open proceedings). "Moots" were a
type of town meeting where attendance was required. See id.
74. See id. at 566 (noting there are few records of history of early jury selec-
tion, however, there is one account, that if believed, shows that since the 16th
century, jury selection has been performed in public). The case quotes Sir
Thomas Smith:
All the rest is doone openlie in the presence of the Judges, the Justices,
the enquest, the prisoner, and so manie as will or can come so neare as to heare
it, and all depositions and witnesses given aloude, that all men may hearefrom the mouth of the depositors and witnesses what is saide.
Id. (quoting T. SMITH, DE REPUBLIcA ANGLORUM 101 (Alston ed. 1972)).
75. Id. (observing presumption of openness surrounding jury selection car-
ried from England to Colonial America and has become common practice in
America today).
76. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
77. See id. at 605 (holding Massachusetts statute providing for exclusion of
general public from trials of specified sexual offenses involving victims under age
of 18 violates First Amendment).
78. See id. at 605-06 (noting majority of Justices in Richmond Newspapers ac-knowledged closure might be permitted under certain circumstances).
79. See id. at 606-07; see also Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556(1976) (discussing tension between enforcing First Amendment and Sixth Amend-
ment rights equally); Malak, supra note 63, at 588 (discussing Globe Newspaper estab-lished "strong presumption in favor of public access" in criminal trials).
80. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07 (commenting decision to restrict
access is weighty one, thus decision must be narrowly tailored).
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lished a case-by-case analysis of the public right of access interests
and the government and defendants' interests in criminal trials.8 1
2. Openness Has Positive Impact in Society
In addition to considering the historical trend of openness, the
Supreme Court has also customarily focused on whether public ac-
cess has had a positive role in the proper functioning of the crimi-
nal justice system. 82 The Court emphasizes how public access can
impair some court proceedings, such as grand jury deliberations. 83
Other procedures, however, such as the selection ofjurors, improve
both the actual and apparent fairness of the criminal trial, which is
essential to maintaining public confidence in the judicial system. 84
The Court reasons that because it is impossible for every citizen to
actually attend all criminal proceedings, allowing open proceedings
gives the public confidence that the courts are conforming to cus-
tomary procedures. 85
81. See id. at 607-08 (suggesting that compelling interest, such as protection of
minor child, does not necessarily validate mandatory closure rule). "[I]t is clear
that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the
interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is
necessary .... Id. at 608.
82. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise
I/") (noting historical role and positive functioning role are two complementary
considerations in cases dealing with claim of First Amendment access right to crim-
inal proceedings).
83. See id. at 9 (showing there are some processes that would be totally frus-
trated if they were to be conducted openly). See generally United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958) (providing why grand jury investiga-
tions must not be open). Grand jury secrecy is necessary:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
plated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delibera-
tions, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before [the] grand jury and
later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect
to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is ex-
onerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation,
and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of
guilt.
Id. (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
84. See Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 681-82 (finding voir dire to be governmen-
tal process that plainly requires public access to enhance basic and perceived
fairness).
85. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) ("Press-Enter-
prise I") ("The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending
trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures
are being followed and that deviations will become known."); see also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) ("People in an open society
2005]
15
Stehlin: Is Open Voir Dire a Good Thing - ABC, Inc. v. Martha Stewart: The
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
312 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
D. Press-Enterprise Balancing Test for Voir Dire
Gannett decided one issue: pretrial proceedings may be
closed.86 Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers settled another
issue: criminal trials should presumptively be open.8 7 What about
voir dire? The Supreme Court has not decided specifically whether
voir dire is a part of the pretrial proceedings or part of the actual
criminal trial.88 In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of California
("Press-Enterprise f'),89 the Court did not decide which category voir
dire falls into, but rather used the First Amendment as the basis of
its decision to prevent closure of voir dire.90
In Press-Enterprise I, the Supreme Court unanimously held the
presumption in favor of public access in criminal trials included the
voir dire examination of potential jurors.91 The Court, however, did
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing.").
86. For a discussion of the holding and reasoning in Gannett, see supra notes
58, 60-64 and accompanying text.
87. For a discussion of the holding and reasoning in Globe Newspaper, see supra
notes 69, 76-81 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the holding and rea-
soning in Richmond Newspapers, see supra notes 63, 73-75 and accompanying text.
88. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 82 (observing vagueness
surrounding decisions on whether voir dire is part of pretrial proceeding or part of
actual trial). The Supreme Court in Gannett initially distinguished between pre-
trial proceedings and the actual trial, however, the holding in Gannett did not con-
tinue the distinction. See id.
89. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
90. See id. at 516-17 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting Court found FirstAmendment right of access only). If the defendant had claimed his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial was compromised, the Court would have had to "deter-
mine whether the selection of the jury was a part of the 'trial' within the meaning
of that Amendment." Id. at 516. In Press-Enterprise I, petitioner, a newspaper com-
pany, asserted it had a fundamental right to attend the voir dire examinations in a
trial concerning the rape and murder of a teenage girl. See id. at 503. The Su-preme Court found the district court's closure of voir dire was incorrect because
there was a failure to articulate findings with the necessary specificity and also a
"failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the tran-
script." Id. at 513.
91. See id. at 501-13 (noting Chief'Justice Burger's majority opinion was joined
by Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor;Justices Stevens and Blackmun filed concurring opinions; and Justice Marshallfiled opinion concurring in judgment). The Burger majority based its decision on
the historical evolution of openness and a desire to maintain public confidence.
See id. at 501-13 (detailing different historial events for support). Justice Black-
mun's concurrence emphasized that the Court had not established any juror right
to privacy. See id. at 513-16. Justice Steven's concurrence emphasized that theCourt did not decide whether voir dire is part of a "trial", but rather used a FirstAmendment basis to reach its decision. See id. at 516-20. Justice Marshall con-
curred in the judgment, but disagreed with any suggestion in the majority decision
that the privacy rights ofjurors lessens the public right to access. See id. at 520-521("Only in the most extraordinary circumstances can the substance of a juror's re-
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not eliminate the option of closing voir dire.92 Rather, it articulated
a two-part test for deciding when the presumption of openness may
be rebutted, resulting in closed voir dire proceedings. 93 Under this
test, voir dire is open unless there is first a specific finding of an
overriding interest that shows closure is necessary to uphold higher
values.94 Second, the closure must be narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.95
The Court further defined the two-part test, set out in Press-
Enterprise I, when it decided Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
California ("Press-Enterprise I') .96 The Court determined the test ap-
plied when the overriding interest asserted is the Sixth Amendment
right of the accused to a fair trial.97 The balancing test of Press-
Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise H poses two questions: first, is closure
of voir dire essential to preserve higher values; and second, is closure
narrowly tailored to serve that interest?
1. Is Closure of Voir Dire Essential to Preserve Higher Values?
In applying the balancing test, a court first considers whether
the petitioning party has satisfactorily demonstrated an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced by open voir dire.98 The peti-
tioning party must demonstrate with specificity the interest to be
sponse to questioning at voir dire be permanently excluded from the salutary scru-
tiny of the public and the press.").
92. See Malak, supra note 63, at 594 (describing Court's historical and public
policy analysis leads to presumption in favor of open voir dire, but does not com-
pletely rule out possibility of closure).
93. See Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510 (describing two part balancing test
necessary to allow closure of jury selection). The case states:
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher val-
ues and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can
determine whether the closure order is properly entered.
Id.
94. See id. at 510-11 (discussing first prong of balancing test).
95. See id. (presenting balancing test for closure of voir dire).
96. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
97. See id. at 14-15 (holding "substantial probability" test is higher burden
than normal "reasonable likelihood" standard). In Press-Enterprise II, petitioner, a
press agency, was excluded from preliminary hearings in a murder trial. See id. at
3-4.
98. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1984) (applying Press-Enterprise I
test). In Waller, the prosecutor wanted to close a suppression hearing. See id. at 41.
The Supreme Court, in applying the balancing test of Press-Enterprise I, held that
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protected and how open voir dire would infringe that interest.99
Two factors frequently encountered in this part of the test include
juror privacy interests and the defendant's right to a fair trial. 100
Previous cases have pinpointed juror privacy as the higher
value that would justify limited media access. 01 Apart from stan-
dard privacy, juror privacy concerns may include contamination
and safety issues. 10 2 Although juror privacy interests may be rele-
vant concerns, it is the defendant's right to a fair trial that takes
precedence over a juror's right to privacy. 10 3 Specifically, if the in-
terest necessary to preserve higher values is the right of the accused
to a fair trial, the court must look at whether "there is a substantial
probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent."104
2. Is Closure Narrowly Tailored to Serve that Interest?
Once the court has established an overriding interest to justify
closing voir dire, the court must narrowly tailor the closure to serve
that particular interest.1 0 5 Primarily, if the interest asserted is the
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, the court must look at
99. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 83 (listing factors petition-
ing party must show to meet closure test of Press-Enterprise).
100. See Malak, supra note 63, at 603 (finding balancing test emphasis on pri-
vacy and safety concerns of potential jurors and on defendant's right to fair trial).
101. See id. at 604 (noting Supreme Court has recognized possible juror pri-
vacy interest that would compel limiting public access to criminal trials); see also
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise 1") (assuming
jurors may have interest in protecting their answers to voir dire questions). The
Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise I, however, requires judges to specify how the
answers are sensitive in nature. See id.
102. See Malak, supra note 63, at 603 (giving example of issues that impact
juror privacy and safety). Public access to jury questioning may leave jurors open
to attack from a defendant's comrades, or leave jurors open to mockery from
strangers or from those who know them personally. See id.
103. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 515 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (empha-
sizing juror's privacy right should not be assumed without carefully considering
complications that assumption would bring). "I agree that the privacy interest of a
juror is a legitimate consideration to be weighed by a trial court .... I put off to
another day consideration of whether and under what conditions that interest rises
to the level of a constitutional right." Id. at 516. Because a defendant has an inter-
est in protecting juror privacy in order to protect the defendant's own fair trial
interest, there is no need to create a separate juror privacy interest. See id. (discuss-
ing concerns of implications of majority's decision).
104. Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise IT)
(stating heightened inquiry to be applied when interest asserted is defendant's
right to fair trial).
105. See id. (explaining finding of reasonable alternatives constitutes narrow
tailoring); see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511 ("Absent consideration of alter-
natives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire.").
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whether there are reasonable alternatives to closure available. 0 6 If
there are reasonable alternatives, a petitioning party is unlikely to
receive closure of the voir dire.a07
The Press-Enterprise decisions clearly advocated a focused con-
trol of any limitations a district court may place on the media for
trial access; the decisions were less clear on how to define "nar-
row."10 8 The majority decision seems to suggest that any narrowly
tailored restriction on access would pass judicial scrutiny. 10 9 Justice
Marshall's concurring opinion, however, suggests "narrowly tai-
lored" means the limitation on access must make use of the least
restrictive means possible. °10 Using either definition, lower courts
have interpreted an acceptable narrow limitation in many different
ways."' Examples of closure limitations found acceptable by re-
viewing courts include complete juror anonymity, in camera voir dire,
106. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511 (discussing need to examine alterna-
tives before ordering closure); see also United States v. King, 140 F.3d 76, 82 (2d
Cir. 1998) (illustrating alternatives to total closure of voir dire). The Second Circuit
in King found that the lower court correctly applied the Press-Enterprise test by tak-
ing steps to establish reasonable alternatives to avoid complete closure. See id. In
King, newspaper publishing companies appealed from orders of the district court
limiting press access to the jury voir dire proceedings in defendant Don King's, a
famous boxing promoter, impending second trial on wire fraud charges. See id. at
78-79. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court's
order denying press access to questioning of prospective jurors in defendant's im-
pending second trial was supported by explicit findings. See id. at 84. The limita-
tions were selected only after considering various alternatives, and the limitations
were imposed only for the brief duration of time necessary to empanel the jury.
See id. at 82-84.
107. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 83 (noting without requi-
site showing of factors, test is not met); see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48-50
(1984) (holding closure must not be broader than necessary). In Waller, the Court
held the state's privacy interest argument was not specific enough to establish the
entire hearing should be closed. See id. Rather, there were alternatives available
unless the state provided more detail showing total closure was necessary. See id.
108. See Malak, supra note 63, at 605 (mentioning difficulty to interpret "nar-
row tailoring" of access limitation).
109. See id. (noting majority decision left open possibility that any limitation
would satisfy part two of balancing test).
110. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stressing
trial court's obligation to limit access by order that "constitutes the least restrictive
means available for protecting compelling state interests"). Justice Marshall opines
the constitutionally favored method for balancing First Amendment interests of
the media and the Sixth Amendment interests of defendants is to issue redacted
transcripts preserving the anonymity of the jurors while keeping the substance of
their responses public. See id. at 520-21.
111. See Malak, supra note 61, at 606 (stating various ways courts have dealt
with problem of choosing acceptable limitations). Examples include complete ju-
ror anonymity, restriction on the number of press representatives, and giving ju-
rors the opportunity to discuss problems with judge in camera. See id.
2005]
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and restricting the number of media representations present dur-
ing voir dire.'12
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSiS
In Stewart, the Second Circuit addressed whether the district
court's order barring the press from attending voir dire infringed
upon the media's First Amendment right of access to criminal pro-
ceedings. 11 3 The court had to balance the First Amendment right
of the press and of the public with the Sixth Amendment right of
the defendants to a fair trial. 114 In doing so, the court first had to
decide whether the district court's motion required application of
the Press-Enterprise test.1 5 Finding the Press-Enterprise test did apply,
the court next explored the two prongs of the balancing test and
held the district court should not have closed the voir dire examina-
tions from the media.' 1 6
A. Is the Press-Enterprise Test Necessary?
The government argued in support of the district court's clo-
sure of voir dire by asserting that the order did not totally impair the
right of access, but merely deprived the Media Coalition of the op-
112. See id. at 606 n.199 (mentioning cases where trial court decisions to limit
media access were upheld by reviewing court). The Second Circuit has allowed for
complete juror anonymity because of extensive pretrial publicity and the "sordid
history" of multi-defendant drug case trials. See id.; see also United States v. Barnes,
604 F.2d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding limitation of number of press repre-
sentatives in courtroom during voir dire). The Press-Enterprise II majority decision
suggested it is the right and duty ofjurors to answer questions in camera when they
realize the sensitive nature of the questions and the possible privacy concerns in-
volved. See 478 U.S. at 1.
113. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (addressing legal
issues in case). The court first felt compelled to demonstrate there was proper
jurisdiction over the case by finding the case fell within the "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. See id. at 97 (quoting
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 6). Under this rule, the court may still hear a case
where the challenged action is finished before it can be fully litigated and there is
a "reasonable expectation" that the same party will face the same action again. See
id. (quoting Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 647-48 (2d Cir.
1998)). Noting voir dire proceedings last only a short time and the media would
continue to seek access to such proceedings in high-profile cases, the court found
that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See id. at 97-98.
114. See id. at 98 (setting forth balancing test of two constitutional rights).
For a discussion of the First and Sixth Amendment issues in voir dire, see supra
notes 53-84 and accompanying text.
115. See id. at 99 (reasoning Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II test needs to
be applied only when First Amendment right of access has been infringed upon).
116. See id. at 106 (stating holding of case).
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portunity to witness voir dire firsthand.1 17 Thus, application of the
balancing test set forth in Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II is
not necessary. 118 The Second Circuit did not agree with this argu-
ment; rather, it found a substantial difference between a reported
transcript and a chance to see and hear testimony as it unfolds. 119
The Second Circuit reasoned, solely because a transcript will be re-
leased does not allow for the application of a more lenient balanc-
ing test.120 The court moved to the issue of whether there was an
adequate factual foundation for disallowing access at all, and thus
applied the Press-Enterprise test to the district court's findings. 121
B. Closure Was Not Essential to Preserve Higher Values
The Second Circuit found closure of voir dire in Stewart was not
necessary because the district court failed to make detailed findings
demonstrating the need to preserve higher values. 122 The higher
value interest asserted in the case was the defendants' Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial. The district court had to establish there
was a considerable likelihood that the defendants' right to an im-
partial jury would be prejudiced by the media exposure, which
could be prevented by closure. 123 In determining that the district
court did not meet this burden, the Second Circuit recounted the
117. See id. at 99 (emphasizing that since transcripts were released after voir
dire proceedings, limited denial of access is not substantial constitutional consider-
ation that overshadows interest of public and defendants for fair trial).
118. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 99-100 (arguing firsthand witness of voir dire is not
protected, rather access to voir dire information via transcripts suffices to pass judi-
cial review).
119. See id. (citing opinions that state differences between documentary ac-
cess and concurrent access); see also United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 n.13
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding "documentary access is not a substitute for concurrent
access, and vice versa"); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1072 (3d
Cir. 1984) (stating "the availability of a trial transcript is no substitute for a public
presence at the trial itself"); Soc'y of Prof 1 Journalists v. United States Sec'y of
Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 578 (D. Utah 1985) ("[T]he full flavor of the hearing
cannot be sensed from the sterile sheets of a transcript.").
120. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 100 (referring to United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d
833, 842 (3d Cir. 1994)). Simone held "we cannot conclude that the release of the
transcript afforded adequate access in this case. To do so would relax the standard
for closure and would undermine one of the essential aspects of access by permit-
ting public scrutiny of the proceedings only at this later time . . . ." Id.
121. See id. (applying factual findings in order to overcome presumption of
openness). For a discussion of the Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II balancing
test, see supra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
122. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 100-01 (noting prior judicial decisions require
closure be supported by need to preserve other higher values). For a discussion of
necessity of specific findings, see supra notes 94, 98-104 and accompanying text.
123. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 100 (referring to increased finding district court
must acquire established in Press-Enterprise I).
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findings of the lower court.' 24 The Second Circuit noted that the
lower court relied on three findings to try to establish a substantial
probability that open proceedings would prejudice the defendants'
rights: the portion of the jury questionnaire that was disclosed to
the public, the likelihood of jurors prejudging the defendants, and
the risk that the jurors would lack candor in their responses to
questioning.1 25
First, the district court found the public's interest in the Stewart
case surpassed that exhibited in other high-profile cases in the dis-
trict court's experience. 126 The Second Circuit, however, found
nothing in the record that pointed to the media's engagement in
improper behavior while covering the case. 12 7 The Second Circuit
did not view disclosure of a portion of the jury questionnaire as
problematic because there was no indication that a media source
posted the information on a website. 128 It was purportedly posted
by a prospective juror.129 The Second Circuit reasoned that the
lower court did not find a substantial probability that the voir dire
proceedings had to be closed because the media would disrupt the
procedure by disclosing information the lower court had previously
forbidden them from revealing. 13 0
Next, the Second Circuit scrutinized the district court's finding
that prospective jurors would have prejudged Stewart in light of the
extensive media coverage.' 3 ' The court explained the case was not
124. See id. at 100 (recounting entire text of district court order by Second
Circuit).
125. See id. at 100-01 (listing findings lower court used in order to establish
closure of voir dire necessary).
126. See id. at 96 (quoting district courtJanuary 15 order, "[t]his is a case in
which the press is interested in all sorts of things in which I have never seen as
much press interest in a case and, as I say, I had many high-profile cases . . .").
127. See id. at 101 (confirming district court's lack of finding of improper be-
havior on part of media). The court found nothing in the record to indicate there
were any instances of media wrongdoings that would distinguish the case from
others. See id. at 105.
128. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 101 (noting lack of indication of misconduct by
media in district court record). See generally Mauro, supra note 47, at 15A (describ-
ing Judge Cedarbaum's reaction to juror questionnaire publication). One of the
questions revealed on the website: "Have you ever made a project or cooked a
recipe from Martha Stewart?" Id.
129. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 101 (mentioning possible juror misconduct); see
also Mauro, supra note 47, at 15A (observing court order will not thwart ill-behaved
prospective juror from "gossiping online").
130. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 100 (distinguishingJudge Cedarbaum's reasoning
that closure of voir dire was necessary because Internet posting showed breach of
her previous order that journalists not talk to jurors).
131. See id. (noting lower court's concern about media coverage containing
editorial statements of opinion about essential merits of charges against Stewart).
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out of the ordinary and most prospective jurors probably have
preconceptions in almost every high-profile criminal case. 132 As the
court suggested, if this element alone is enough to allow closure,
then most cases followed by the public would be closed "and the
exception to openness would swallow the rule."'
3 3
Finally, the court disagreed with the lower court's determina-
tion that the media attention would prohibit prospective jurors
from speaking candidly during questioning.134 To illustrate this,
the court found it odd to argue that a potential juror would not
want to be candid in front of a reporter, but would be willing to
reveal a bias against the defendant in- front of the defendant in the
courtroom.'3 5 The court distinguished the Stewart case from United
States v. King,13 6 an earlier Second Circuit decision.13 7 The district
court relied upon King in issuing its order.'38 In King, the voir dire
questioning required jurors to express their feelings on racism and
132. See id. (refusing district court's stance that Stewart case was out of ordi-
nary); see also Mauro, supra note 47, at 15A (opining jury with no prejudgments is
not desirable). The bestjury would be composed of individuals who are intelligent
enough to have been exposed to pretrial publicity about the defendant, but are
able to detach any preconceptions from the facts presented to them in court. See
Mauro, supra note 47, at 15A. If trial judges can "bang their gavels" and instruct
jurors to "disregard what [they] have just heard", it follows that we should allow
them to disregard what they have learned from the media before the trial as well.
See id.
133. Stewart, 360 F.3d at 101.
134. See id. (detailing district court's belief that if media is present at voir dire
session or if media will disclose names of prospective jurors, it is possible that ve-
nire persons would not want to give "full and frank" answers); see alsoJulie Rawe,
MarthaJockeys For A Jury, TIME MAG., Jan. 19, 2004, at 18 (noting outcome of trial
turns on how jury personally views defendant Stewart). "The fate of the domestic
diva ... hinges on whether the jury sees her as a cover-up artist or as a victim of
overzealous prosecutors." Id.
135. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 101 (highlighting problems in lower court's treat-
ment of possible effects of reports on juror's will to speak openly). The court
lightly commented on defendant Stewart's pleasant profession as a home-
decorator:
It is, for example, difficult to imagine a person losing his or her job be-
cause he or she acknowledged admiration for or animosity toward Stew-
art. Nor would it have required the theologian's heroic virtue for a
person to express for publication a distrust in corporate leadership or a
distaste of the niceties of home decorating.
Id. at 101-02.
136. 140 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1998).
137. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 101 (distinguishing King).
138. See id. at 102 (distinguishing case at hand by noting lack of findings in
record or district court's opinion suggesting reporters would have "chilled" juror
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explain their personal racial views. 139 This examination of particu-
larly sensitive issues caused the district court to recognize potential
jurors were not likely to be candid if they harbored racist views.140
The court in Stewart found no similar controversial issues in its case
and found once again the lower court did not establish a substantial
probability that open voir dire would prejudice the defendants'
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.14'
To strengthen its decision, the Stewart court considered many
similar decisions in cases decided by other circuits.' 42 The Third,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts have each reversed orders of dis-
trict courts denying members of the press access to voir dire pro-
ceedings. 143 Moreover, the Stewart court noted there are only two
circuit court cases that have upheld the closure of voir dire and each
case could be differentiated from the issues in Stewart.'44
139. See King, 140 F.3d at 83 (noting jurors were asked to set forth personal
views on racism). The Stewart court mentions the government asserted the possi-
bility of sexist attitudes prejudicing jurors' impartiality, however, the court refused
to decide whether the possible sexism would be enough to justify closure because
the government did not raise the issue at the district court level. See 360 F.3d at
102. Nonetheless, the court reviewed the voir dire transcripts and found no ques-
tions that required the potential jurors to talk about gender bias. See id. There-
fore, even if the government had raised the sexism issue more timely, there is
nothing in the proceedings that would have affected juror candor. See id.
140. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 102 (distinguishing King and noting that no simi-
lar issues were present in case at hand).
141. See id. (claiming it is hard to believe jurors would fear repercussions for
acknowledging their high regard for or hatred toward defendant Stewart).
"Where, as here, the voir dire proceedings do not explore particularly sensitive or
controversial issues, knowledge that reporters are present probably discourages
fabrication and ensures honesty on the part of venirepersons." Id.
142. See id. at 102-03 (remarking sister circuits have also reversed orders that
closed voir dire proceedings in high-profile cases).
143. See id. at 103 (citing United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 841 (3d. Cir.
1994), In re Memphis Publ'g Co., 887 F.2d 646, 64748 (6th Cir. 1989), and United
States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 755, 761 (7th Cir. 1985)). In In reMemphis, the Sixth
Circuit reversed an order of closure, mandating voir dire cannot be closed without
any specific finding of fact to support that conclusion. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 103.
A "naked assertion" that the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant might be
harmed is insufficient. See id. Similarly, in Peters, the Seventh Circuit found the
district court did not make specific enough findings regarding any threat the me-
dia coverage posed to finding an impartialjury. See id. In Simone, the Third Circuit
stated they did not believe the concern about juror candor constituted sufficient
reason to close voir dire. See id. "[T] he trial court needs to provide specific reasons
in support of a conclusion that any effects that the presence of the press and pub-
lic would have on candor are sufficiently greater than in the run of cases." Id.
(quoting Simone, 14 F.3d at 841).
144. See id. at 103-04 (citing In re South Carolina Press Ass'n, 946 F.2d 1037,
1042 (4th Cir. 1991), and In re Greensboro News Co., 727 F.2d 1320, 1321 (4th Cir.
1984)). In In re Greensboro, a case involving Nazi and Klansmen defendants, the
Fourth Circuit found the case evoked strong opinions and that some potentialjurors may be reluctant to express their opinions knowing their answers could be
[Vol. 12: p. 297
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C. Closure Was Not Narrowly Tailored
After establishing the first part of the Press-Enterprise I and Press-
Enterprise II test was not met, the Second Circuit addressed the sec-
ond prong of the balancing test which required closure orders to
be no broader than necessary to protect the interest advanced in
the first part of the balancing test.14 5 The court found the district
court's order did not utilize a narrowly-tailored method of closure
and, as a result, did not meet the second part of the balancing
test.146 The Second Circuit observed two available alternatives the
district court could have used to address its concerns about media
exposure while keeping voir dire proceedings open.
147
The Second Circuit first suggested concealing the identities of
the prospective jurors to ensure juror candor.14 8 The court com-
mented that other courts have been able to conceal juror identity
without closing voir dire proceedings. 149 Second, the court sug-
gested a split proceeding where the media could be present when
potential jurors are asked routine background questions or are sub-
reported in the press. See 727 F.2d at 1325 (noting holding of case). The Fourth
Circuit applied the same reasoning to In re South Carolina, a case requiringjurors to
discuss racial biases and criminal records of their family members. See 946 F.2d at
1042.
145. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 104 (applying "narrow tailoring" standard to clo-
sure orders in question). The court could have stopped after finding that the first
part of the test was not met, but elaborated to show that there were alternatives
available had the district court met part one by demonstrating a substantial
probability that defendants' rights would be prejudiced by an open voir dire pro-
ceeding. See id.
146. See id. (furthering notion that closure orders may not be considered nar-
rowly tailored if reasonable alternatives exist). For a discussion of part two of the
Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II balancing test, see supra notes 105-12 and
accompanying text.
147. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 104 (remarking, however, that alternatives pro-
posed are not strict directions to be applied formulaically in future voir dire closure
cases). The court stressed that "different circumstances call for different cures."
Id.
148. See id. (explaining that this alternative differs from district court's order
that also conceals juror names, but has voir dire take place in robing room). The
Second Circuit suggests concealing names while allowing media members in court-
room. See id. In oral argument, the government rejected the Second Circuit's
alternative because in the robing room potential jurors do not know transcripts
will be available, thus, there is perceived anonymity. See id. Whereas in an open
courtroom, even though their names will be redacted, potential jurors will be
aware of the media's presence and will be hesitant to speak freely. See id. at 105.
The Second Circuit refused the government's argument because of the inference
that the district court would have intended to mislead venire members into a per-
ceived anonymity. See id.
149. See id. at 104-05 (indicating it is possible to hide juror identity without
total closure of voir dire to public).
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mitting hardship requests. 150 With the presence of two easily attain-
able alternatives, the Second Circuit held that the district court did
not narrowly tailor the closure, did not pass the second part of the
test, and therefore, did not overcome the presumption of open-
ness.151 The court vacated the portion of the district court's order
excluding the media from being present at the voir dire
proceedings.152
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit correctly identified the test set forth in
Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise H as the proper test for analyzing
competing First and Sixth Amendment issues in voir dire.'53 The
court then meticulously applied the test and gave supporting rea-
sons for why it disagreed with the lower court's use of the test.1 54
The court reasonably found that the district court did not satisfy
part one of the balancing test because of a lack of specific find-
ings. 155 Given earlier Supreme Court opinions that suggest releas-
ing transcripts of the proceedings to the public does not violate the
First Amendment, the Stewart court may have incorrectly decided
the district court did not narrowly tailor the voir dire closure.156
In consideration of the lower court's decision to close voir dire,
the Second Circuit reviewed and critiqued the district court's rea-
150. See id. at 105 (mentioning split examination as possible alternative tobarring media from entire voir dire proceeding). There is no harm done in al-lowing the press to be present while potential jurors are providing "trivial details".See id. The Stewart court points out that in United States v. King, 140 F.3d 76 (2dCir. 1998), the split voir dire examination alternative was not used simply because it
was not requested, however, the method was an available option to ensure truthful-
ness from prospective jurors. See id. at 105.
151. See id. at 106 (emphasizing how burden is on those who wish to restrict
media access to show why closure would be essential to preserve right to fair trial).
152. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 106 (noting Media Coalition's requested relief for
court to vacate portion of order that barred media from attending voir dire
proceedings).
153. See id. at 98 ("Where the competing interest asserted is the right of the
accused to a fair trial, the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II fashioned the ...balancing test for determining whether closure is appropriate . . ").
154. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's application of the Press-Enterprise
/and Press-Enterprise !!test as applied in Stewart, see supra notes 116-52 and accom-
panying text.
155. For a discussion of the district court's lack of findings of a "substantialprobability" the defendants' rights would be violated, see supra notes 112-44 and
accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion that pi-oviding tran-
scripts when voir dire is closed does not violate the media's First Amendment right
to attend a trial, see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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soning and methodically gave reasons for why it was flawed. 157 In
support of its decision, the Stewart court relied heavily on Supreme
Court cases that have addressed the issue of conflicting First and
Sixth Amendment rights. 158 The court also relied upon other cir-
cuit court decisions in reaching its own decision to open voir dire.
159
Importantly, the court distinguished the King case, a case the dis-
trict court relied heavily upon in its decision to close voir dire in
Stewart. This distinction was justified because of the obvious lack of
possible threats to the defendants' rights in the Stewart case com-
pared to the King case.
160
Second, the Stewart court left open the possibility that in the
future there would be a need for voir dire to be closed. 16
1 This calls
for a case-by-case investigation of the facts of every case involving
the closure of voir dire as previously determined by the Supreme
Court in Gannett.'62 The Second Circuit gave examples of alterna-
tives to complete closure that would satisfy the narrowly tailored
portion of the Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II test. The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, inexplicably does not place any weight on the
district court's express attempt not to hinder the media's First
Amendment rights by printing and releasing a redacted tran-
script.163 On the contrary, the Stewart court uses a unique argu-
ment that implicates that closing voir dire denies the press the "color
157. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 101 (finding district court made insufficient find-
ings to establish open voir dire proceedings would prejudice defendant's right to
impartial jury). The district court had no basis for its conclusion that prospective
jurors would be unwilling to express any preconceptions. See id. The district court
did not point to any controversial issue to be brought up in voir dire questioning
that would impair the candor of the prospective jurors. See id.
158. See id. at 98 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984), and Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)). The Stewart court relied
on the Waller opinion to show the First Amendment may be overridden by the
Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to a fair trial. See id. at 98. Further, the
Stewart court relied on the Richmond Newspapers plurality opinion to show the im-
portance of the First Amendment guarantee to attend criminal trials; it prevents
the press' freedom of speech from being eliminated. See id.
159. For a discussion of the other United States Court of Appeals cases deal-
ing with closure of voir dire, see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
160. For a discussion of the Stewart court's treatment of the King case, see
supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
161. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 105 (emphasizing right of accused to fair trial is
most sacred constitutional right). There is a heavy burden on those who want to
restrict access to the media, however, the district court could have overcome this
burden if it had provided a sufficient factual basis and compelling justification for
closure to ensure it was narrowly tailored. See id. at 106.
162. For a discussion of the case-by-case analysis rule set out in Gannett, see
supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
163. See Stewart, 360 F.3d at 99 (rejecting government's argument that district
court's order did not entirely impair public's First Amendment right of access).
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and texture" of the proceeding. 164 Applying the Supreme Court's
opinions provided in Gannett and Press Enterprise I, it is debatable
whether the Second Circuit correctly ruled the district court did
not sufficiently tailor the order closing voir dire.165 The court found
part one of the balancing test was not met, thus, it is not essential to
the outcome of the Stewart case as to whether part two was correctly
decided. The Second Circuit's disregard of the Supreme Court's
precedent in allowing transcripts to substitute for open voir dire may
cause confusion in future cases. 166
VI. IMPACT
In Stewart, the Second Circuit decided the "mere fact of intense
media coverage of a celebrity defendant... is simply not enough tojustify closure" of voir dire.167 The decision, reached by a prominent
circuit court, to keep voir dire open will likely receive attention from
other judges confronted with similar cases.168 One commentator
notes, "j] udges in high-profile cases hate bad press, but more im-
portantly they hate being scolded by appellate courts. ' 169 There-
fore, lower courts which have to make important decisions about
164. See id. ("The ability to see and to hear a proceeding as is [sic] unfolds is a
vital component of the First Amendment right of access-not, as the government
describes, an incremental benefit."); see also Barrett, supra note 48 (commenting
on differences between open voir dire and reading transcript). "You don't get agood sense of a ballgame if you're just handed a scorecard and a transcript of theplay-by-play. The American public deserves to know how justice is being carried
out from the beginning to the end of the process." Barrett, supra note 48.
165. See Gary Young, The closed voir dire for Martha Stewart, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26,
2004, at I (noting case law supports argument that transcript availability allows for
closed voir dire). Courts in recent cases, such as the trials of the Oklahoma Citybombers, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, have become increasingly aware
that jurors will not be candid if they feel a large audience is listening to their
answers. See id.
166. See Barrett, supra note 48 (expressing concern over language of Stewart
decision). Ken Paulson, executive director of the First Amendment Center, points
out the Second Circuit "explored the possibility of allowing the public to see thejury but keeping the jury members anonymous." Id. As an advocate of FirstAmendment rights for both the press and the public, Paulson found the "wiggle
room" left by the court troubling. See id.
167. Stewart, 360 F.3d at 106. The court further noted, "[t]o hold otherwise
would render the First Amendment right of access meaningless; the very demand
for openness would paradoxically defeat its availability." Id. at 102.
168. See Barbara Wartelle Wall, Legal Watch: Closure of Juror Questioning Over-
turned in Martha Stewart Trial, NEWS WATCH, at http://www.gannett.com/go/new-
swatch/2004/march/nw0305-6.htm (Mar. 5, 2004) (remarking Stewart decision is
expected to significantly impact future right of access cases).
169. Barrett, supra note 48 (suggesting judges will "step more gingerly" in
cases that involve restricting public's First Amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings).
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how to control high-profile trials may be more careful when decid-
ing whether or not to close voir dire proceedings in the future.
170
It should also be considered that even though the Stewart trial
court closed voir dire, there were still problems inside the jury
room.17 1 After the jury found defendants Stewart and Bacanovic
guilty, there were numerous media reports of juror misconduct
ranging from jurors purposefully lying in their answers to questions
on the voir dire questionnaire to jurors reading newspaper articles
about the Stewart case while in the jury room.172 One juror even
wanted to change her decision and find Bacanovic not guilty.
173
Despite these discrepancies, some jurors announced they deliber-
ately worked hard to forget about Stewart's high-profile status and
only concentrated on the evidence presented. 174 Perhaps the ef-
forts the trial court took to select ideal jurors paid off.
The Stewart decision may address the two problems tradition-
ally involved in high-profile cases: media bias affecting juries and
inequalities in the courtroom. 175 First, the decision was a major vic-
tory for First Amendment and freedom of the press advocates.
176
The Second Circuit's decision in Stewart was also a step in the direc-
170. See id. (observing impact of Stewart decision). Although the decision va-
cating the closure of voir dire was too late to be applicable to the Stewart trial, the
decision will have a long-term effect on all future trials. See id.
171. See Alison Gendar & Greg B. Smith, Marthajuror's regret, N.Y DAmLY NEWS,
Apr. 14, 2004, at 4 (announcing problems inside Stewart jury room).
172. See id. (listing various instances of juror misconduct). Juror Michelle
Wisner told the media the jury discussed certain media reports that included the
hourly rate of Stewart's attorney and the price of Stewart's handbag. See id.
173. See id. (stating that Juror Michelle Wisner contacted Bacanovic's attor-
ney to reveal questionable juror behavior as well as to state she believed Bacanovic
deserved another trial). "Martha Stewart, her persona, her bad behavior, it pulled
him down with her. The government was gunning for Martha Stewart and Peter
Bacanovic got sucked in." Id.
174. See Soni Sangha & Corky Siemaszko, Jury Bites Back, N.Y. DAILY NEws,
Mar. 6, 2004, at 5 (noting jurors did not focus on Stewart's celebrity status). One
juror commented, "I had no problem separating her from her TV persona ....
We weighed all the testimony. I think everybody came to the table with their un-
derstanding of the facts." Id.
175. For a discussion of the problems created by high-profile celebrity trials,
see supra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
176. See Mark Hamblett, Panel Rejects Barring Media From Stewart Trial Voir
Dire, LAW.COM, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=10764 2 834 7 79 2 # (Feb.
19, 2004) (noting benefit that decision has on media's First Amendment rights).
Quoting First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams:
What struck me most was the court's insistence that open judicial
processes benefit justice, benefit defendants and benefit the public at
large .... We hear so much about the potential, and sometimes real bad
side of the press' presence at trial that it's refreshing to read a clearly
focused opinion that emphasizes the public benefit.
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tion toward keeping trials for celebrities on an equal playing field
with trials for the general public. 177
Besides furthering the media and public's First Amendment
right to access to trials, the decision will also protect future defend-
ants' abilities to receive fair trials.1 78 The court's decision will
demonstrate to the public that there is not a separate court system
for celebrities, and ensure that celebrity defendants are also af-
forded the opportunity for a fair trial. 179 Open voir dire, when ana-
lyzed through the application of a detailed balancing test, will turn
out to be a "good thing" for everybody involved.
Catherine Stehlin
177. See ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 102 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[I]n general,
openness acts to protect, rather than to threaten the right to a fair trial."); see alsoHamblett, supra note 176 (quoting First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams). TheStewart opinion is "a ringing affirmation of the notion that courts are not onlypresumptively open to the public but that is so even during high-publicity cases
absent the most persuasive evidence that they must be closed." Hamblett, supra
note 176; see also Paulson, supra note 48 (remarking best way to keep public confi-dence in judicial system is to administer justice evenly without regard to celebrity
status).
178. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 37, at 88 (opining court solu-tion involving application of precise standard to constitutional clash of First andSixth Amendments is appropriate). Applying standard tests to constitutional is-
sues acknowledges:
[T]he realities of a modern society in which there is instantaneous dis-
semination of information by the mass media. When the First Amend-
ment was established, the notice that inculpatory evidence against an
accused in a local judicial proceeding might be transmitted instantane-
ously across the county in a way that might create mass hysteria and pas-
sion was beyond any comprehension. The standard [test] also recognizes
that the law cannot permit pre-trial publicity protected by the FirstAmendment to immunize a defendant from all criminal liability.
Id. at 88-89.
179. See Mauro, supra note 47, at 15A (observing defendants can still obtainfair trial if judges keep in mind paradigm of fair-minded jurors); see also PatriciaHurtado, MarthaJudge Sticks to Press Ban ofJury Picks, NEWSDAY, Jan. 17. 2004, at A08(arguing treating celebrity trials differently from trials of ordinary citizens is notfair). It cannot be "the cases that the public is the most interested in are the ones
where they have the least right of access." Id.
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